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EXPANDING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAWS 
Kathleen S. Morris* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article calls on Congress and the state legislatures to grant 
large cities and counties standing to enforce the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (the FTC Act) and its state statutory counterparts 
(or little Acts).  The FTC Act, a federal law, prohibits businesses 
from engaging in any ‘‘unlawful,’’ ‘‘unfair,’’ or ‘‘deceptive’’ acts or 
practices, and the little Acts apply similarly broad prohibitions in all 
fifty states.  This fifty-one-statute consumer protection regime-----
which has been the law of the land for several decades-----carries 
enormous promise to halt a wide range of unlawful and harmful 
corporate practices in their earliest stages.  Unfortunately, that 
promise has not been fulfilled because these laws are chronically 
under-enforced.  At present, only one federal agency-----the Federal 
Trade Commission-----has broad standing to enforce the FTC Act; 
while state Attorneys General and consumers typically have standing 
to enforce the little Acts, they cannot keep up with the rate of 
corporate malfeasance.  This Article argues that the nation’s 
legislatures should invite cities and counties with populations over 
50,000 into consumer protection enforcement by granting them 
standing to seek injunctive relief and penalties under the FTC Act 
and little Acts.  It addresses the practical benefits and barriers to 
disaggregating consumer protection enforcement in this way and 
discusses the attendant localism and federalism concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The nation’s consumer protection regime is broken.1  The problem 
is not a lack of good law: federal and state legislatures have enacted 
 
* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law.  For their comments 
on this Article, I thank the student editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal and 
the faculty and student participants in the 2013 Fordham Urban Law Journal 
Symposium.  For helpful discussions, I thank Heather Gerken, Kaitlin Ainsworth, 
and Erin Bernstein.  For their terrific work compiling the attached Appendix, I thank 
Yale Law School students Daniel Isaacs, Edwina Clarke, Deborah Megdal, Laura 
Raposo, and Celia Rhoads.  For excellent research assistance, I thank Golden Gate 
University School of Law student William Doyle. 
 1. By ‘‘consumer protection’’ I mean any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent practice 
by a corporation that harms consumers, investors, or competitors.  This Article 
assumes that consumer protection laws should be enforced in a manner that 
maximizes the ‘‘public interest,’’ by which I mean not only the physical but also the 
economic health and safety of consumers and the economy. See Amy Widman, 
Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of 
State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and 
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 189 (2010) (‘‘Defining 
‘public interest’ is difficult. . . . In the context of consumer protection, the public 
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far-reaching consumer protection statutes, most notably the 
expansive Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act or the Act)2 
and its state statutory counterparts (the little Acts).3  The problem is 
that due to insufficient funding and staffing,4 industry capture,5 or 
some combination of both,6 these potentially powerful bodies of 
consumer protection law are woefully under-enforced.7 
 
interest largely consists of the health and safety of consumers, and anti-public-
interest behavior is the absence of regulation or enforcement.’’) (citing the ‘‘activist 
theory of regulation’’ described in Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing 
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment Of Citizen Suits Under Federal 
Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 884--89 (1985)). 
 2. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting 
all ‘‘unfair methods of competition’’ and ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’’).  The 
Act makes ‘‘unfair’’ or ‘‘deceptive’’ acts or practices unlawful (illegal acts or practices 
are per se ‘‘unfair’’).  As the Act’s language suggests, it is capable of operating either 
substantively or procedurally.  When used as a procedural vehicle for enforcing other 
laws, it is conceptually akin to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), though aimed at corporate 
rather than government malfeasance. 
 3. See Appendix for a list of every state’s so-called ‘‘little FTC Act.’’  California’s 
Act has arguably the broadest language, which prohibits ‘‘any unlawful, unfair, or 
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising and any [specified] act prohibited by Chapter 1.’’ CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 17200  Some state statutes create a more specific laundry list of unfair 
practices. See Appendix. 
 4. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 65 (2010) (describing the federal Consumer 
Products Safety Commission (CPSC), which Congress created more than forty years 
ago, as ‘‘chronically underfunded and understaffed’’); see also Philip G. Schrag, On 
Her Majesty’s Secret Service: Protecting The Consumer In New York City, 80 YALE 
L.J. 1529, 1530 (1971) (‘‘Inadequate funding, understaffing, weak legislation, lack of 
public support, over-bureaucratization and the absence of any real sense of mission 
conspired to render government agencies ineffective or, in some cases, servants of 
industry, while consumer fraud flourished.’’). 
 5. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 16 (describing consumer protection in particular 
as ‘‘a breeding ground for capture’’). 
 6. See id. at 16, 17--18, 65 (blaming both industry capture and lack of funding and 
staffing for failures of the federal banking and consumer agencies). 
 7. See id. at 15, 65--72 (detailing forty years of failed efforts by the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission); see also LAUREN K. SAUNDERS, NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., PREEMPTION AND REGULATORY REFORM: RESTORE THE STATES’ 
TRADITIONAL ROLE AS ‘‘FIRST RESPONDER’’ 15 (2009), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/preemption/restore-the-role-of-states-2009.pdf 
(arguing that over time the credit marketplace-----in such areas as mortgages, 
overdraft fees, and overall lending-----has developed a ‘‘culture of deception’’ fueled in 
part by under-enforcement of state law due to federal preemption); Widman, supra 
note 1, at 179--91 (documenting how lax federal enforcement has compromised 
consumer protection and weakened the Consumer Product Safety Commission). 
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At present, the FTC Act is enforced almost exclusively by the FTC 
itself.8  The Act does not provide for a private right of action or public 
rights of action by state or local governments (unlike, for example, 
the Clean Air Act).9  Furthermore, among the fifty little Acts, only 
seven permit city and county enforcement,10 and only eleven permit 
district attorney enforcement.11  This paper calls for Congress and the 
state legislatures to extend consumer protection enforcement 
standing to cities and counties with populations over 50,000.12 
For several decades, scholars and policy experts have pointed out 
the enormous gaps in consumer protection enforcement, and called 
for a more effective approach.  Nearly half a century ago, Ralph 
Nader’s book Unsafe at Any Speed spurred broad efforts to protect 
consumers.13  Ten years after Mr. Nader published his book, Ann 
 
 8. The only exception to FTC enforcement is that the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency enforces the Act against the banking industry. See generally Fredric 
J. Bendremer, Applicability of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to 
National Banks, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 189 (2003). 
 9. See Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., of N.M., 703 F.2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 
1983) (noting the absence of a private right of action under the FTC Act); Dreisbach 
v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. V. 
Interstate Cigar Co. 499 F. 2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).  In sharp contrast, the 
federal civil rights statute provides for a private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act and Clean Air Act provide for not only a 
private but a public-----including municipal-----right of action. See Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7604(a)(1) (2006); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 
60121, 60101(a)(17) (2006). 
 10. Those states are California, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia. See Appendix. 
 11. Those states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  District attorneys 
are often hybrid state-local creatures, in that they are technically state actors but 
elected by a local constituency.  As Ann Marie Tracey argued long ago, prosecutors 
would also make logical partners in consumer protection enforcement. See Ann 
Marie Tracey, Consumer Protection: An Expanded Role for the Local Prosecutor, 44 
U. CIN. L. REV. 81, 81--82 (1975).  But some have suggested that prosecutors may be 
uncomfortable criminalizing consumer protection violations. See William F. 
Mulroney, Deceptive Practices In The Marketplace: Consumer Protection by New 
York Government Agencies, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 491, 496 (1974). 
 12. I suggest drawing the line at 50,000 to allow for participation by at least one 
city or county in each of the fifty states.  The smallest such jurisdiction is the city of 
San Marcos, Texas (population 50,001). Largest Cities by Population-----Full List, 
BIGGESTUSCITIES.COM, http://www.biggestuscities.com/?full=1 (last visited Oct. 16, 
2013).  This measure would permit consumer protection enforcement by roughly 700 
cities and 1000 counties. See Largest Cities by Population, supra; Population of US 
Counties, DEMOCRAT & CHRON., http://rocdocs.democratandchronicle.com/database/ 
population-us-counties (last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
 13. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
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Marie Tracey pointed out that ‘‘[c]onsumer laws are not self-
executing,’’ and called for local criminal prosecution of consumer 
rights violations.14  In the nearly four decades since then, politicians15 
and scholars16 have joined consumer rights advocates to rally for 
better and stronger consumer protection. 
Unfortunately, public and private efforts to rein in corporate 
abuses have fallen short.  As Rachel Barkow wrote, ‘‘[Pu]blic interest 
advocacy groups . . . are no match for the resources and political clout 
of the industries that oppose consumer protection laws.’’17  If 
anything, unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent corporate practices are 
becoming increasingly more widespread, complex, and damaging to 
the economy.18  Cities and counties pay an enormous price for 
corporate lawbreaking,19 yet can do very little about it.  They cannot 
enforce existing laws, and powers and preemption doctrines, along 
with public policy concerns, constrain local legislation.  Accordingly, 
the only real-----and arguably ideal-----role for cities and counties is as 
active enforcers of state and federal law. 
This Article is not the first to consider the potential benefits and 
pitfalls of disaggregated civil law enforcement.  In recent years legal 
scholars including Amy Widman, Rachel Barkow, Gillian Metzger, 
and Margaret Lemos have written either about state enforcement of 
federal law in general,20 or more particularly, state enforcement of 
federal consumer protection statutes.21  And as early as 2006, 
 
 14. See Tracey, supra note 11, at 81--82. 
 15. In 1985, the late Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio introduced a bill 
providing for state attorney general enforcement of the FTC Act. See Thomas W. 
Queen, Recent Developments in Federal Antitrust Legislation, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 
383, 394 (1985).  That bill was never enacted into law. 
 16. See, e.g., Tracey, supra note 11, at 81--82. 
 17. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 65. 
 18. Corporate malfeasance in the financial services industry is perhaps the most 
egregious recent example of unchecked corporate power. See generally CHARLES 
GASPARINO, THE SELLOUT: HOW THREE DECADES OF WALL STREET GREED AND 
GOVERNMENT MISMANAGEMENT DESTROYED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
(2009). 
 19. See generally THIERRY PAULAIS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS (2009), available at http://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/ 
citiesalliance.org/files/Paulais_LocalGovernmentsandtheFinancialCrisis_Eng.pdf 
(documenting the devastating impact of the financial crisis on local governments). 
 20. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency 
Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 21. See Barkow, supra note 4, at 65. See generally Widman, supra note 1. 
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Kathleen Engel called on state legislatures to disaggregate the 
enforcement of state lending laws.22 
This Article fills a gap in the existing literature by considering 
whether cities and counties should have standing to enforce the Act 
and little Acts; and by discussing the theoretical implications for 
localism and federalism of disaggregating consumer protection 
enforcement to cities and counties.  This Article begins to fill those 
gaps in the literature.  On the policy front, it suggests that Congress 
and state legislatures should grant cities and counties of over 50,000 
people standing to enforce the FTC Act and the little Acts.23  On the 
theoretical front, it addresses localism (and briefly, federalism) 
concerns, disaggregated enforcement raises, and explains why 
pushing more power to the local level in the consumer area may serve 
rather than undercut a healthy localism.24  It argues that a healthy 
modern localism’s ultimate goal is to maximize local power, not 
necessarily local autonomy, and that in the consumer protection 
context the most sensible way to increase local power is by allowing 
local enforcement of state and federal laws rather than enacting and 
defending local laws against preemption. 
As Nestor Davidson wrote, ‘‘[a]t the heart of cooperative localism 
is the potential-----which will not be realized in all instances-----of an 
alchemical reaction that can be sparked when national goals are 
filtered through the instrumentality of local communities.’’25  This 
Article challenges policymakers and scholars to consider that 
potential in the context of consumer protection enforcement.  It 
proceeds in three parts.  Part I summarizes the Act and little Acts and 
 
 22. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing The 
Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 359--60 (2006). 
 23. This Article focuses exclusively on local public enforcement of the FTC Act 
and parallel state statutes.  It does not address local enforcement of other state and 
federal laws or private enforcement of the FTC Act. 
 24. This Article’s localism discussion mirrors an active debate among federalism 
scholars-----led by Heather Gerken-----about whether and how democracy and 
federalist theories can and should account for localities. See generally Heather K. 
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013); Heather K. Gerken, 
The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941 (2013); Heather K. 
Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010). 
 25. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in 
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1033 (2007); Roderick M. Hills Jr., 
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (‘‘[T]he benefits of federalism in the present and in the 
future will rest on how the federal and state governments will interact, not in how 
they act in isolation from each other.’’). 
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current barriers to public and private enforcement.  Part II proposes 
local government enforcement of the Act and little Acts, and 
considers the practical barriers to and benefits of this proposal.  Part 
III addresses the theoretical concerns this proposal raises. 
I.  THE CURRENT CONSUMER PROTECTION ENFORCEMENT 
REGIME AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
A. The FTC Act 
Congress established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or 
Commission) in 1914 as an independent agency to enforce the Act.  
The Act has existed more or less in its present form since 1938.26  The 
Act’s operative language, commonly referred to as ‘‘section 5,’’ 
broadly prohibits ‘‘unfair methods of competition’’ and ‘‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.’’27  The Commission has described the 
factors it considers in determining whether a practice that is neither 
unlawful nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair: 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously 
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established 
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-----whether, in other 
words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, 
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it 
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it 
causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other 
businessmen).28 
This language is strikingly flexible and far-reaching, and Congress 
and the federal courts grant the FTC broad sway in fashioning rules 
to effectuate and enforce section 5.29  Moreover, the Act is a civil 
rather than criminal statute, so liability is established under the 
relatively low preponderance standard.  The Act does not limit the 
types of corporations plaintiffs may sue or the types of practices 
plaintiffs may challenge. 
 
 26. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384--85 (1965) (explaining 
the history of the Act). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 28. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or 
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards 
of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 
408). 
 29. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (holding 
that the FTC may prohibit conduct under § 5 even if it violates neither the letter nor 
the spirit of any more specific federal laws). 
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But the Act has a glaring enforcement limitation: only the FTC has 
broad authority to enforce the Act.30  Unlike other federal statutes, 
the Act does not allow private rights of action, public rights of action 
by state attorneys general, or public rights of action by local public 
entities.31  The FTC has just seven regional divisions-----in Cleveland, 
Chicago, New York, Seattle, Atlanta, Dallas, and Los Angeles-San 
Francisco-----to cover the entire nation.32  The FTC’s modest regional 
presence surely contributes to its limited effectiveness.33 
B. The Little Acts 
Each of the fifty states has passed some version of the F.T.C Act.34  
These laws have some substantive variation, presumably because 
each statute is tailored to the politics and policy preferences of its 
particular state.35  As for their enforcement provisions, an 
 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2012). See generally FTC, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2008: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (2008), 
available at www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/P084802fdcpareport.pdf (noting that while § 
1692l(b) grants very narrow standing to other federal agencies, they rarely have cause 
to enforce the Act). 
 31. See Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., of N.M. 703 F. 2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 
1983) (noting the absence of a private right of action under the FTC Act); Dreisbach 
v. Murphy, 658 F. 2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate 
Cigar Co., 499 F. 2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).  By contrast, to take just two 
examples, the federal civil rights statute provides for a private right of action against 
public actors who commit civil rights violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  
Similarly, the Clean Water Act and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act provides for 
private and public rights of action to enforce that statute and regulations 
promulgated thereunder: 
A person may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the 
United States for an injunction against another person (including the 
United States Government and other governmental authorities to the extent 
permitted under the 11th amendment to the Constitution) for a violation of 
this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter. 
49 U.S.C. § 60121 (2006).  ‘‘Person’’ is defined broadly to include states and 
municipalities. See 49 U.S.C. § 60101(a)(17). 
 32. See FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION (2013), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcp-org-chart.pdf. 
 33. See James J. Pulliam, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Market Competitors, UDAP 
Consumer Protection Laws, and the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1251, 
1255--56 (2010) (arguing that under-enforcement of the little Acts has contributed to 
harmful, unlawful business practices, and calling for business competitor standing to 
sue). 
 34. See Appendix. 
 35. States also have common law tort theories that can be applied in the consumer 
protection area, such as fraud, nuisance, and unjust enrichment. See Engel, supra 
note 22, at 367.  This Article focuses on statutes because, to the extent a consumer 
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overwhelming number of little Acts rely on a combination of state 
government enforcement36 and private rights of action37 to effectuate 
their provisions.38  Only fifteen of the fifty states allow any kind of 
local enforcement of consumer protection laws: seven states allow at 
least some city and county (civil) consumer protection enforcement 
(California, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia);39 eleven states allow district attorneys-----often a hybrid 
of state and local40-----to pursue (criminal) enforcement (Alabama, 
California, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas).41  Some of these states 
limit the local public entities that can bring suit, and/or incorporate 
procedural safeguards such as requiring prior state certification of 
localities as enforcement agents,42 prior approval by the state before 
filing suit,43 or prior notification to the state before filing suit,44 but at 
least make use of some local law enforcement resources.  By contrast, 
 
protection statute prohibits ‘‘unlawful’’ acts, it provides a vehicle for enforcing all 
statutory and common law. 
 36. Most state statutes contemplate enforcement by the Attorney General and 
State’s attorneys; some also have state officers specifically charged with enforcement. 
See Appendix. 
 37. Forty-two states’ consumer protection laws contemplate private enforcement 
by persons harmed.  They are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. See Appendix.  Five states do not provide for private enforcement. 
They are: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, and Maine. See id. 
 38. Only one state-----Minnesota-----relies entirely on private enforcement. See id. 
 39. See id.  As Ann Marie Tracey argued long ago, prosecutors are also logical 
partners in consumer protection enforcement. See Tracey, supra note 11, at 81--82.  
But prosecutors tend to be experts in criminal rather than civil law enforcement, and 
some have suggested prosecutors may be uncomfortable criminalizing economic 
wrongdoing. See Mulroney, supra note 11, at 496. 
 40. In many states, district attorneys are technically state actors, but they are 
elected and paid by local governments. 
 41. See Appendix.  Unfortunately, it seems that prosecutors are not only 
stretched thin, but are also often uncomfortable with charging consumer protection 
violations criminally, so it may not make sense to grant them exclusive enforcement. 
See Mulroney, supra note 11, at 496. 
 42. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56.8-14.1 (West 2012). 
 43. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-130 (1976). 
 44. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.501 (West 2011). 
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thirty-five states do not provide for any local consumer protection 
enforcement, whether criminal or civil.45 
C. Barriers to Local Legislation 
The next logical question is: why not solve this problem by enacting 
and enforcing local consumer protection laws?  That would be the 
most localist approach to expanding consumer protection, and some 
localities have passed such laws. 
The problem is that local legislative efforts are subject to challenge 
under preemption46 and powers47 doctrines.48  As Paul Diller 
observed, ‘‘when a city adopts a new policy that differs from state law 
and may harm some segment of the business community, a 
preemption challenge is almost certain to follow.’’49  When it comes to 
consumer (and environmental) protection, it has been difficult even 
for states to enact laws that hold up against federal preemption 
challenges.  For this very reason, legal scholars including Amy 
Widman,50 Rachel Barkow,51 Gillian Metzger,52 and Margaret Lemos53 
have suggested that Congress grant state government actors standing 
to enforce federal law.  Even absent a preemption threat, it may be 
 
 45. See Appendix. 
 46. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal. 
2005) (sustaining a preemption challenge to a local consumer protection ordinance). 
 47. See, e.g., Hunters Anglers and Trappers Ass’n of Vt. v. Winooski Valley Park 
Dist., 913 A.2d 391, 395 (Vt. 2006) (considering and rejecting a powers challenge to 
local law). 
 48. See generally Engel, supra note 22. 
 49. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2007) 
(urging a more relaxed approach to state preemption to allow for greater local 
experimentation); Nicholas P. Miller & Alan Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 
WASH. L. REV. 85 (1981) (preemption of local laws regulating cable television); 
Warren, Gorham, & Lamont, Inc., Truth-In-Lending Act Does Not Preempt City 
Consumer Protection Law, 89 BANKING L.J. 345 (1972) (preemption of local laws 
regulating banks); see also Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 
P.2d 916, 925--30 (Cal. 1991), which provides a concrete example.  In this case, the 
City of Los Angeles, a home rule city, imposed a local license tax on a savings and 
loan association.  The California Supreme Court struck down the ordinance on state 
law preemption grounds, finding bank taxes to be a matter of statewide rather than 
local concern. Id. at 915, 931. 
 50. Widman, supra note 1, at 166--67 (urging Congress to promote regulatory 
enforcement of federal product safety laws by granting states standing to enforce 
federal law). 
 51. See generally Barkow, supra note 4. 
 52. See generally Metzger, supra note 20. 
 53. See generally Lemos, supra note 20. 
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impractical for localities to enact consumer protection legislation at a 
time when business is moving decidedly in not just a national but 
global direction.  Compared to Congress and the state legislatures, 
localities are not terribly well positioned to enact consumer 
protection legislation.  But compared to federal and state agencies, 
localities are uniquely well positioned to enforce consumer protection 
legislation. 
D. Barriers to Private Enforcement Actions 
This Article makes the case that we need more public enforcement 
of consumer protection laws-----but why?  Most little Acts permit 
private enforcement;54 why isn’t private enforcement enough?  Legal 
scholars and jurists have ably explained the multiple barriers to 
private enforcement of consumer protection laws.  They include: 
(1) Private Arbitration Agreements: Corporations have 
increasingly turned to arbitration agreements to prevent 
consumers from bringing disputes into court, and courts have 
energetically backed those agreements.55  The efficacy of 
arbitration (as opposed to litigation) is subject to spirited 
scholarly debate.56  For purposes of this Article, we need only 
observe that, because public entities like cities and counties are 
not signatories to consumer arbitration agreements, they can 
bring enforcement actions into court. 
(2) Class Action Requirements: Courts have increasingly tightened 
class action requirements-----most recently the requirement of 
commonality-----limiting private litigants’ ability to vindicate 
consumer interests.57  A government actor who brings an 
enforcement action files on behalf of the public at large rather 
than a specified class, and thus need not satisfy any of the usual 
class action requirements. 
(3) ‘‘Actual Injury’’ Standing Requirements: Courts often apply 
stringent ‘‘actual injury’’ requirements in citizen suits, which can 
restrict private plaintiffs’ ability to stop corporate 
 
 54. See Appendix. 
 55. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-
Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2011). 
 56. See generally id. 
 57. See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, 
and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441 (2013). 
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malfeasance.58  A government actor seeking to enjoin an unfair 
business practice on behalf of the public at large is typically not 
subject to the same stringent ‘‘actual injury’’ requirements.59 
(4) Aggressive Litigation Tactics: When the plaintiff in a consumer 
lawsuit is an individual or group of individuals, corporate 
defendants have the option of engaging in a war of attrition via 
the discovery process.60  A government actor who brings an 
enforcement action on behalf of the public at large is subject to 
much more limited discovery, because such cases focus on the 
defendant’s conduct or whether the defendant is violating the 
law,61 and not on whether the plaintiff in the case is at fault. 
(5) Bankruptcy Stays: Corporations seeking bankruptcy can seek a 
stay of private consumer protection enforcement actions. 62  
However, corporations cannot seek a stay in public 
enforcement cases.63  Due to this distinction, public 
enforcement of consumer protection laws against bankrupt 
corporations (along with efforts to recover funds via the 
bankruptcy process) may continue even though a bankruptcy 
filing would have halted private enforcement immediately. 
 
 58. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen 
Suits, ‘‘Injuries,’’ and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).  The ‘‘actual injury’’ 
requirement has been hotly debated in the consumer protection context. See 
generally id.  As of 2004 (when California citizens enacted Proposition 64) a private 
plaintiff only has standing to invoke the statute if he or she personally ‘‘suffered 
injury in fact’’ in the form of a loss of money or property as a result of the challenged 
practice. Pulliam, supra note 33, at 1282.  Ballot materials in support of Proposition 
64, a statutory ballot measure that passed fifty-nine percent to forty-one percent, 
stated that some private plaintiffs’ attorneys were using section 17200 to generate 
attorney’s fees without creating a corresponding public benefit. See id. at 1294.  The 
supporters sought to put an end to suits brought on behalf of plaintiffs who had not 
been personally economically harmed by the challenged business practice. See id.  At 
least one commentator has called for state legislatures to eliminate the ‘‘actual 
injury’’ requirement for a business competitor of the defendant who seeks to pursue a 
representative claim for unfair business practices. See id. at 1285--86. 
 59. See, e.g., Green v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981). 
 60. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 
(1989). 
 61. See In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 37--38 (Cal. 2009). 
 62. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2012). 
 63. See id. 
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E. Why Consider Local (Rather than Additional State or 
Federal) Consumer Protection Enforcement? 
The best reasons to consider local enforcement rather than simply 
adding more state or federal enforcement of consumer protection 
laws are proximity, industry capture, and the need to increase local 
government sophistication. 
With respect to proximity, ‘‘localities are the primary site for many 
areas of public policy at the center of modern life.’’64  They operate 
not only as governments, but also as public corporations.65  They are 
simultaneously playing the game and watching from the sidelines.  
This dual vantage point makes them uniquely suited to the role of 
corporate watchdog.  Indeed, one could fairly argue that-----as among 
our three levels of government-----localities are the most immediately 
steeped in the world of commerce, and thus uniquely positioned to 
assist with consumer protection enforcement. 
With respect to industry capture, Margaret Lemos has argued 
forcefully that disaggregating enforcement of federal law to the states 
would help maintain robust enforcement in the face of federal agency 
‘‘capture’’ by corporate interests.66  The same could be said of 
disaggregating enforcement of federal and state law to local public 
entities.67  That’s not to say cities and counties would not be 
vulnerable to capture; the question of local government capture 
would have to be studied closely. 
Finally, with respect to the need to increase local government’s 
economic sophistication, consumer fraud schemes are becoming ever 
more complex.68  To fend against the next wave of corporate 
 
 64. Davidson, supra note 25, at 968. 
 65. See Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement 
in Local Public Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, 
AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 51 52--53 (Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2010). 
 66. See Lemos, supra note 20, at 706 (explaining that non-federal government 
enforcement of federal law disrupts the monopoly on enforcement).  Professor 
Lemos posits that there are two types of public enforcement. Id. at 699.  This Article 
contends that there are three. 
 67. A recent example is San Francisco’s suit against California under the Federal 
Gas Pipeline Safety Act. See generally Complaint, City & Cnty. of San Francisco. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 12-0711, 2013 WL 2433811 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2013).  
San Francisco alleges that both federal and state agencies charged with ensuring gas 
pipeline safety have been captured by the energy industry, utterly undermining 
enforcement and placing lives at risk. See generally id. 
 68. The debacle involving securitization of mortgages is a classic example of how 
complicated and dangerous corporate malfeasance has become. 
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malfeasance, we need our local government employees to be 
sophisticated enough so they can catch and help defend against 
harmful corporate behavior. 
II.  EXPANDING LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 
A. Municipal Right of Action Under FTC Act 
Congress could enact the most sweeping expansion of local 
consumer protection enforcement by granting large cities and 
counties standing to seek injunctive relief and penalties under the 
FTC Act.  Taking this step would transform the Act into a procedural 
vehicle akin to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though aimed (of course) at 
corporate rather than government malfeasance.  If state legislatures 
were willing to grant localities standing under the little Acts then 
local public standing under the FTC Act would not be absolutely 
essential.  But granting standing under the FTC Act would be the 
fastest, most efficient, and most comprehensive means of drawing 
cities and counties into consumer protection enforcement.69 
B. Municipal Right of Action Under the Little Acts 
Alternatively (or additionally), state legislatures could amend the 
standing provisions in consumer protection statutes to grant cities and 
counties the ability to enforce them.  This Article employs 
California’s version of a little Act-----California Business & Professions 
Code Section 17200-----as an active example to allow us to envision 
how this move might play out.  Section 17200 serves as a solid model 
for two reasons.  First, because its language closely mirrors the FTC 
Act’s language, tracking how section 17200 has operated in California 
over the past few decades gives us a reasonably reliable picture of 
 
 69. The federal government could opt for a narrower alternative to granting local 
government standing to enforce the Act.  It could opt to enter into contracts with 
selected localities to enforce the Act, as it has in the immigration context. See 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 567, 591--92 (2008) (discussing § 287(g) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, which authorizes localities to enter into agreements with the federal 
government to enforce federal immigration laws).  Contract-based enforcement has 
the potential to be both narrower and broader than statutory enforcement: narrower 
because cities and counties would gain enforcement powers-----if at all-----contract-by-
contract, jurisdiction by jurisdiction; broader because the contract could in theory 
allow the locality to do more than just file suit. See id.  Some § 287(g) agreements 
allow localities to engage in direct enforcement as if they were federal agents. See id. 
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how a ‘‘national section 17200’’ might operate.70  Second, California 
courts rely heavily on federal court interpretations of the FTC Act to 
interpret section 17200,71 which helps us picture a ‘‘national section 
17200’’ from a jurisprudential perspective. 
By all accounts, localities with standing to enforce section 17200 
have found it to be flexible and powerful.72  It is flexible because, like 
the FTC Act, section 17200 has both substantive and procedural 
components.  Substantively, section 17200 permits courts to set new 
standards of fair and unfair business practices in response to the 
endless creativity of business models.73  Procedurally, section 17200’s 
prohibition against any ‘‘unlawful’’ conduct means plaintiffs can 
‘‘borrow’’ violations of other statutes that may or may not themselves 
provide for private rights of action.74  Yet also importantly, section 
17200 checks the possibility that appellate courts might issue 
 
 70. California has a population of over thirty-eight million. State & County 
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html 
(last updated June 27, 2013).  California has the ninth largest economy in the world. 
MAC TAYLOR, CAL FACTS 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
reports/2013/calfacts/calfacts_010213.pdf. 
 71. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 543 (Cal. 
1999) (‘‘In view of the similarity of language and obvious identity of purpose of the 
[the Act and section 17200], decisions of the federal court on the subject are more 
than ordinarily persuasive.’’ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 72. For a discussion of how one city has made the most of section 17200’s 
flexibility and power, see generally Morris, supra note 65. 
 73. As the California Supreme Court put it nearly eighty years ago: 
The fact that a scheme is original in its conception is not a good argument 
against its circumvention.  It has been said in . . . one of the leading cases on 
unfair competition in this state: The fact that the question comes to us in an 
entirely new guise, and that the schemer has concocted a kind of deception 
heretofore unheard of in legal jurisprudence, is no reason why equity is 
either unable or unwilling to deal with him.  It has been said by some judge 
or law writer that no fixed rules can be established upon which to deal with 
fraud, for, were courts of equity to once declare rules prescribing the 
limitations of their power in dealing with it, the jurisdiction would be 
perpetually cramped and eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man’s 
invention would contrive. 
Am. Philatelic Soc’y v. Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  California courts continue to develop substantive law under section 
17200 as circumstances require. See Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Whitter & Co., 
95 Cal Rptr. 2d 258, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (‘‘The Legislature . . . intended by this 
sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful business conduct 
in whatever context such activity might occur.’’ (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 74. For a recent explication of section 17200’s operation and reach, see Hinojos v. 
Kohl’s Corp., 718 F. 3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Roskind, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 251. 
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overbroad or inconsistent rulings by requiring localities to inform the 
state Attorney General if an appellate court takes an appeal or writ 
involving judicial interpretation of that statute.75 
Section 17200 is also powerful for several reasons.  It allows 
localities to challenge indirectly business practices that are unlawful 
even if they lack the power to regulate those practices directly (that is, 
even if direct oversight is committed exclusively to state agencies), 
and even if the underlying substantive law cannot be directly 
enforced.  Also, section 17200 reaches not only current but also past 
unlawful acts or practices if they are likely to recur.76  Local 
enforcement of state and federal consumer protection laws can be 
conducted by in-house city and county counsel, or alternatively, by 
law firms hired to represent those entities.77 
Finally, under California law, if a local public entity recovers civil 
penalties in a section 17200 action, that entity not only can but must 
use those funds for future enforcement of consumer protection laws.78  
In other words, California local consumer protection enforcement, 
when successful, is self-funding.  But when that system is not 
successful (that is, when a case is brought that is legally or factually 
 
 75. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17209, 17536.5 (West 2012).  Because this 
requirement is not jurisdictional, the Attorney General may be notified after the 
appeal is taken as long as the appellate court grants the State an opportunity to be 
heard before it issues a legal interpretation of section 17200. See Californians for 
Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 627--28 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997), abrogated by Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods., 999 P.2d 706 
(Cal. 2000). 
 76. See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1097 
(Cal. 1998) (explaining the reach of section 17200), superseded by statute as stated 
in Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009).  Each act that constitutes a 
violation of section 17200 can potentially carry a separate civil penalty. See BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 17206. 
 77. For example, the law firm of Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy filed eight federal 
lawsuits on behalf of various California municipalities, alleging that banks rigged the 
benchmark interest rate tied to trillions of dollars of loans and financial products 
worldwide, thereby increasing their profits at the expense of institutional investors, 
including their clients. See Vanessa Blum, Cotchett Firm Stakes Claim in LIBOR 
Mess, RECORDER (Cal.), Jan. 9, 2013.  Potential damages have been estimated to be 
upwards of one trillion dollars. See id.  In California, when law firms represent public 
entities, in-house municipal counsel must control the litigation to avoid potential 
conflict-of-interest issues. See County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 
35 (Cal. 2010) (approving the use of contingency counsel in affirmative litigation by 
municipalities as long as the litigation was ultimately controlled by public lawyers, 
who have a higher duty of neutrality than private plaintiff’s attorneys). 
 78. See BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206. 
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tenuous), it is not self-funding.  This simultaneously encourages good 
and discourages bad (that is, specious) public enforcement. 
Overall, section 17200 has had a tremendously positive impact on 
the rights of California consumers.  One scholar has described court 
decisions applying section 17200 as having ‘‘chang[ed] the maxim 
‘caveat emptor’ into ‘caveat vendor.’’’79 
C. Practical Barriers to Local Consumer Protection 
Enforcement 
Local consumer protection enforcement would undoubtedly raise 
significant practical barriers.  This Article groups these barriers into 
four categories-----politics, money, culture and sophistication-----and 
comments briefly on each of them. 
1. Politics 
Granting localities standing to enforce state and federal consumer 
protection laws would be politically bold.  Even if state and federal 
legislatures limited enforcement to localities with a population of 
more than 50,000, that move would add more than one thousand 
potential80 corporate watchdog entities to the national and state 
scenes.  It is logical to expect such a proposal to provoke significant 
corporate opposition, as have proposals for state enforcement of 
federal laws.81  It is impossible to know whether, given the reality of 
corporate funding in politics,82 consumer advocates in the public and 
private sectors could ever overcome certain political opposition. 
It is worth noting, however, that while this move would be 
politically bold, it would not be truly radical.  Local enforcement is 
not new; localities have a long history of seeking injunctions against 
corporations to abate economically harmful business practices, 
including in complex cases.83  Local government statutory standing is 
 
 79. See Wesley J. Howard, Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial 
Interpretation, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 721 (1979). 
 80. I say ‘‘potential’’ because no locality would be obliged to engage in consumer 
protection enforcement, but it could if it were willing and able to do so. 
 81. See generally Widman, supra note 1. 
 82. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (ruling 
that the First Amendment prohibits governments from restricting political 
independent expenditures by corporations, associations, or labor unions). 
 83. A frequently used legal ‘‘hook’’ at the local level is the common law of public 
nuisance.  Perhaps the most successful local public nuisance case ever prosecuted was 
San Francisco’s case-----brought in collaboration with several state attorneys general-----
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not new: localities already have standing to enforce, and have been 
successfully enforcing, various federal and state laws designed to 
protect the general public.84  Corporate malfeasance across the nation 
has reached a point where legal scholars85 and public lawyers86 are 
pushing for increased criminal prosecution of corporate malfeasants.  
A policy proposal that contemplates not criminal, but merely civil 
consumer protection enforcement is more modest.  Yet like criminal 
enforcement, engaging in more robust civil enforcement also has the 
potential for political upside.87  After all, local voters who are pro-
 
against the tobacco industry. See Morris, supra note 65, at 54.  The case sought 
successfully to recover county public health dollars spent to treat tobacco-related 
illnesses. See City & County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, 957 F. Supp. 1130, 
1137 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Morris, supra, note 65, at 54.  San Francisco has recovered in 
excess of $260 million to date and used most of the money to rebuild Laguna Honda 
Hospital, a century-old county health care facility for low-income elderly and 
disabled persons. See JOHN THOMAS, LAGUNA HONDA HOSPITAL REPLACEMENT 
PROGRAM: QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT PRESENTED TO THE CITIZENS’ GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BOND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 2--3 (2012), available at 
http://www.sfcontroller.org/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=3329; see also 
TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS TO COUNTIES AND CITIES 
1999--2013, available at http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/ 
settlements/TMSAPC_REV.pdf?. 
 84. To take two federal examples, localities have statutory standing to enforce the 
federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7604(a)(1) (2006), and the Natural Gas 
Pipeline Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  Additionally, in California, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, localities 
have statutory standing to enforce little FTC Acts. See Appendix. 
 85. See Pulliam, supra note 33, at 1285 (urging state legislatures to eliminate the 
‘‘injury in fact’’ standing requirement when a business competitor of the defendant 
seeks to bring a representative consumer claim for unfair business practices).  In his 
Article, Professor Pulliam called on state legislatures to grant standing under state 
consumer protection statutes to business competitors, arguing that competitors are 
more likely than either individuals or governments to learn of unfair business 
practices and be in a position to sue. See id. at 1284--89. 
 86. See Press Release, Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley, Former Mortgage Broker 
Sentenced to Serve at Least Two Years in State Prison for Role in Elaborate 
Mortgage Fraud Scheme (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/2011/former-mortgage-broker-sentenced-to-serve-at.html; 
Monique Bryher, Attorney General Brown Files Criminal Charges Against Mortgage 
Brokers, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/fraud-in-los-
angeles/attorney-general-brown-files-criminal-charges-against-mortgage-brokers. See 
generally David Segal, Financial Fraud Is Focus of Attack by Prosecutors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/business/12crime.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 87. To take the most prominent recent example, Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth 
Warren, a first-time candidate, ran for Senate on a platform of holding corporations 
accountable for harming consumers and the economy. See Katharine Q. Seelye, 
Warren Defeats Brown in Massachusetts Senate Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-massachusetts-
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business may also have a strong law-and-order perspective.  When 
framed as law-and-order, local enforcement of the Act and little Acts 
may yield political benefits for the responsible elected officials. 
2. Money 
Litigation costs money.  How can cash-strapped localities take on 
these cases?  Many may be daunted by such a task and decline to use 
enforcement powers even if they had them.  On the other hand, the 
absence of consumer protection enforcement is expensive for 
localities since they are particularly hard-hit by the negative 
consequences of unchecked corporate malfeasance.88  Viewed in this 
way, local enforcement of unfair business practices laws may 
represent a wise local government investment.  Moreover, if cities and 
counties choose their cases wisely, they should recoup their initial 
investment in relatively short order.  Many of the Act and little Acts 
have penalty provisions that can be leveraged to reimburse localities 
(and ultimately, their constituents) for the cost of pursuing 
enforcement actions against corporate lawbreakers.89  (These 
provisions also provide a healthy check on overreach by local public 
law offices, since the costs associated with unsuccessful cases would 
not be reimbursed.)  State and federal governments might consider 
overcoming this financial barrier by lending seed money to localities 
willing to engage in consumer protection enforcement so they get 
their first docket of cases off the ground. 
 
senate-scott-brown.html?_r=0.  Although she was a Democrat running in a 
traditionally Democratic state, political analysts partly attributed her popularity to 
her promise to ‘‘hold the big guys’’-----corporations-----‘‘accountable.’’ Id. 
 88. See generally PAULAIS, supra note 19 (documenting the devastating impact of 
the financial crisis on local governments).  Kathleen Engel made this point with 
respect to predatory lending, when she wrote: 
Predatory lenders penetrate communities and, like polluters, leave 
distressed properties and desperate people in their wake.  The task of 
cleaning up falls to cities, yet predatory lending reduces the resources 
available for this clean up.  Declining property values resulting from 
predatory lending mean reduced tax revenues just as abandoned buildings 
lead to increased demand for fire and police protection.  City budgets are 
further strained when victims of predatory lending turn to cities for relief 
programs and protection from abusive lenders.  In the language of 
economics, predatory lending imposes negative externalities on cities. 
Engel, supra note 22, at 359--60. 
 89. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West 2012). 
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3. Culture 
Another practical concern is that local public law offices might not 
initially embrace (or even understand) a role of consumer law 
enforcement plaintiff.  I have written that localities may be culturally 
resistant to taking on this role for several reasons.90  First, local 
governments are often so cash-strapped it may be difficult for their 
law offices to imagine doing more.  Second, local public law offices 
historically conduct almost entirely defensive litigation-----that is, they 
defend the locality when it is sued-----and are not used to being 
plaintiffs.91  But that resistance may be waning.  As more and more 
localities have engaged in affirmative litigation to the benefit of 
constituents and their own bottom-lines, a growing number local 
public law offices are open to plaintiff’s litigation.92  But in the end, 
since each locality is the architect of its own docket, those that would 
rather not participate could simply decline to use their new 
enforcement authority. 
4. Sophistication 
Local public enforcement of the Act and little Acts raises the 
practical barrier that many localities-----and local public law offices-----
may lack the sophistication to go after the kinds of complex corporate 
schemes federal and state governments are accustomed to tackling.  
That problem undoubtedly exists for many if not most cities and 
counties at present.  Ultimately, each locality would have to decide 
what kinds of cases it can and cannot bring.  The broad, flexible 
language of the Act and little Acts, which prohibit ‘‘unlawful,’’ 
‘‘unfair,’’ or ‘‘fraudulent’’ business practices, leave room for each 
locality to pursue complex cases,93 simple cases,94 or some of each, 
 
 90. See generally Morris, supra note 65. 
 91. See id. at 52 (arguing that ‘‘often it is institutional culture, not legal barriers, 
that bounds city and county law office activities’’); Adam Liptak, Ban on Gay 
Marriage Led Lawyers to Shift Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/us/san-franciscos-role-in-opposing-gay-marriage-
ban-led-way-to-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all (quoting the San Francisco City 
Attorney’s point that in order to pursue plaintiff’s cases a local public law office must 
first step out of its traditional defense role). 
 92. See Morris, supra note 65, at 60. 
 93. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties for Violations of 
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, People v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, No. 
CGC-08-473569 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2008) (pursuing a complex scheme by bank 
and arbitration company); Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers 
(Guess Who Wins), BUS. WK., June 15, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/stories/ 
MORRIS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:24 PM 
2013] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1923 
depending on its capacity and expertise.  Importantly, as explained 
earlier, the ‘‘lack of sophistication’’ argument is vulnerable to being 
turned on its head.  The flexibility of a ‘‘national section 17200’’ would 
provide opportunities for an ambitious locality to expand its 
economic and financial sophistication over time by tracking, case-by-
case, the trends, costs, and benefits of evolving business practices.  
Local governments’ increased sophistication would ultimately benefit 
their constituents. 
III.  THEORETICAL CONCERNS DISAGGREGATION RAISES 
A. Localism Concerns: What About Local Autonomy? 
The central idea in this Article is a policy idea, namely that 
localities can and should be invited into state and federal consumer 
protection enforcement.  This, however, is related to a broader 
theoretical ambition-----which is to craft a coherent, workable, and 
constitutionally sound theory of the role localities do and should play 
in our constitutional democracy.  Put another way, we must move 
towards a healthy and modern localism.  That goal requires us to 
grapple with potential localist critiques of proposals like the one 
presented here. 
The most serious localist argument against expanding local 
enforcement of state and federal consumer protection laws is that 
doing so would not further local autonomy and may even undermine 
it.  ‘‘Autonomy’’ has been a major theme in local government 
scholarship since Gerald Frug revived the field in 1980.95  Local 
government scholars have, for example, opposed local enforcement of 
state and federal constitutional law on the ground that it would 
undermine the push for more local autonomy.96  Needless to say, a 
 
2008-06-04/banks-vs-dot-consumers-guess-who-wins.  For a list of the wide range of 
cases San Francisco has pursued under section 17200, see Morris, supra note 65, at 
54--56. 
 94. See generally People ex. rel. Herrera v. Stender, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2013) (pursuing a relatively simple action against a law firm and an attorney for 
unfair business practices vis-à-vis immigration clients). 
 95. See generally Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1059 (1980). 
 96. See e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing 
the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2232 (2006) (arguing that local constitutional 
enforcement undermines localism); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional 
Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 152--53 (2005). But see 
Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-
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purely localist approach to consumer protection legislation would be 
to enact local law and then defend those laws against the inevitable 
powers and preemption challenges.97  This Article takes autonomy 
seriously, and offers two observations on that subject in the context of 
localism. 
The first observation is that the traditional localist account of local 
autonomy seems to focus, sub silentio, on legislative autonomy.  That 
is, by ‘‘autonomy’’ local government scholars seem to mean the ability 
to declare what the law is at a local level and seal the locality off from 
state and federal interference.98  Not all autonomy, however, is 
expressed legislatively.  Localities can also exercise executive 
autonomy.99  In the context of civil law enforcement, local executive 
autonomy takes forms such as exercising prosecutorial discretion, 
prosecuting public interest litigation, and negotiating settlements in 
the public interest.  Viewed this way, local enforcement of federal and 
state consumer protection law is a form of local (executive) 
autonomy.100 
 
C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that local constitutional enforcement favors local 
interests overall). 
 97. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 925--31 
(Cal. 1991) (finding that the City of Los Angeles, a home rule city, imposed a local 
licensing tax on a savings and loan association and striking down the ordinance on 
state law preemption grounds, finding bank taxes to be a matter of statewide rather 
than local concern); Diller, supra note 49, at 1114--15 (urging a more relaxed 
approach to state preemption to allow for greater local experimentation because 
‘‘when a city adopts a new policy that differs from state law and may harm some 
segment of the business community, a preemption challenge is almost certain to 
follow’’). See generally Engel, supra note 22; Miller & Beals, supra note 49 
(discussing the evolution of local cable television laws); Warren, Gorham, & Lamont, 
Inc., supra note 49, at 345 (discussing the preemption of local laws regulating banks). 
 98. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2257 
(2003) (equating Home Rule with ‘‘autonomy’’); Gerald Frug, Decentering 
Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 254 (1993) (‘‘[The traditional account of 
decentralized power] presents localities as being able to do whatever they want: they 
can act in their own self-interest, cooperate with others on their own terms, and cause 
harm to those who disagree with them.  The political term for this form of autonomy 
is ‘sovereignty.’’’). 
 99. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 69 (dissecting local § 287(g) agreements 
with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and discussing how local executive 
autonomy often expresses itself through the ability to move freely in the marketplace 
by entering into private and public contracts). 
 100. Local enforcement of federal and state law may not pose the kind of threat to 
state and federal power that local legislative autonomy does.  At a basic level, local 
legislative autonomy sends a ‘‘keep out’’ message.  Local enforcement sends a very 
different message, namely, ‘‘let’s fix this.’’  The latter message may be more likely to 
realize the full benefits of cooperative federalism. 
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Needless to say, if ‘‘local autonomy’’ means only local legislative 
autonomy, then my proposal does nothing to advance it.  But if that 
term also includes executive autonomy, my proposal suggests that in 
some areas-----such as consumer protection-----it might be worth giving 
up autonomy on the legislative side of local government to gain more 
autonomy on the executive side.  Local enforcement of federal and 
state consumer protection laws is a good example of a policy that 
would simultaneously undermine local legislative autonomy and 
strengthen local executive autonomy. 
A second observation about localism and autonomy is that local 
government scholars tend to treat maximizing local autonomy as an 
end in itself, rather than as a path to power.101  ‘‘Power’’ and 
‘‘autonomy’’ are not synonymous and they do not always rise and fall 
together.102  Localism’s ultimate goal may be better aimed at 
maximizing local power-----rather than local autonomy.  If we were to 
set aside local autonomy as the ultimate goal of localism, and instead 
define localism as the attainment of local power, we might shift our 
focus to policy alternatives that increase power, whether or not they 
increase autonomy.  In each circumstance, rather than asking: what is 
the clearest path to local autonomy in this context?; we would ask: 
what is the clearest path to local power in this context? 
In the consumer protection context, there are two potential paths 
to local power: (1) enacting local consumer protection laws (then 
fighting powers and preemption battles), or (2) using standing 
doctrine to leverage state and federal consumer protection laws for 
the benefit of local constituents.  Increasing leverage rather than 
autonomy would not only be easier to defend in court, it might 
actually make better policy sense.  As business moves nationally and 
internationally, we may be better off setting basic standards at the 
federal level and enforcing those standards at the federal, state, and 
local levels rather than setting three layers of substantive standards.  
By contrast, in other contexts, it may be a better policy to allow local 
legislative autonomy.103  In sum, perhaps instead of asking ‘‘what will 
maximize local autonomy,’’ a healthy, modern localism asks, ‘‘is 
 
 101. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-----The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (impliedly equating autonomy and 
power). 
 102. See Morris, supra note 96. 
 103. See Rodriguez, supra note 69 (arguing in favor of local legislative autonomy in 
the immigration context). 
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autonomy, leverage, or some other means the best way to maximize 
local power?’’ 
B. Federalism Concerns: Uniformity, Over-Enforcement, and 
Parochialism 
In addition to localism concerns, local enforcement of federal and 
state consumer protection laws raises at least three familiar 
federalism concerns: (1) multiple enforcers of the Act and little Acts 
would disrupt the existing uniformity of consumer protection law, (2) 
the laws would be over-enforced as compared with the optimal level 
of enforcement, and (3) localities would be prone to parochialism in 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
Lack of uniformity and over-enforcement concerns are also at play 
when considering state enforcement of federal law, so federalism 
scholars have begun to take an empirical look at these questions.  
There are few data, and to the extent they exist they are 
inconclusive.104  In the absence of data, it makes sense build in 
common-sense legal safeguards that minimize the risks of dis-
uniformity and over-enforcement. 
There is no question that allowing localities to enforce federal and 
state consumer protection laws will weaken higher-level control.  This 
is an inevitable trade-off of all disaggregation.  As Stephen Lee has 
written in the immigration context a ‘‘diminished capacity for 
oversight is often one of the trade-offs involved in disaggregating 
enforcement authority.  While such a design handicaps a principal’s 
powers of oversight, it often creates a competitive environment 
among agents, which creates incentives for the agents to produce 
better outcomes while deepening and broadening their expertise.’’105  
Those dangers should be controlled through legislative safeguards 
such as notice provisions, certification provisions, or contract-
controlled local enforcement.106 
 
 104. See generally Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A 
Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1343 (2013). 
 105. Steven Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 
n.104 (2011). 
 106. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 69 (discussing that some state statutes 
require localities to provide notice before filing suit while others require local public 
law offices to go through a certification process before commencing enforcement of 
state law, and how a contract-based approach might be akin to so-called § 287(g) 
agreements, which permit local enforcement of federal immigration laws). 
MORRIS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:24 PM 
2013] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1927 
Turning finally to parochialism, as a practical matter, ‘‘[a]ny 
argument for enhancing local autonomy requires a leap of faith that 
local political institutions are worthy of that autonomy.’’107  Thus, to 
disaggregate consumer protection enforcement is to embrace a robust 
vertical federalism, because each public laws office-----federal, state 
and local-----would be permitted to exercise prosecutorial discretion 
based on the needs and values of its constituent group.  Put another 
way, one person’s ‘‘parochialism’’ is another person’s ‘‘representative 
democracy.’’108 
Even accepting parochialism as a real threat of disaggregation, it 
may be that there are some contexts-----such as consumer protection 
enforcement-----in which we may be able to tolerate a little 
parochialism.  After all, no matter who files a consumer protection 
case, it is always going to be fundamentally built on facts that allege 
one or more business actors, operating in a particular place, are 
harming consumers and businesses in that same place.  To some 
degree, consumer protection enforcement may be inherently 
parochial, and thus the perfect place to experiment with 
disaggregation of enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Localities and their constituents need greater consumer protection 
enforcement.  But consumer protection laws need not be enacted at 
the local level to be enforced there.  Localities may not be well-
positioned to enact consumer protection statutes, but they are 
uniquely well-positioned to enforce them.  Perhaps the best way to 
better control corporate malfeasance is not through local laws, but 
local watchdogs. 
  
 
 107. Davidson, supra note 25, at 1019. 
 108. See Lemos, supra note 20, at 745 (discussing a similar idea). 
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APPENDIX 
Fifty-State Survey: State Consumer Protection Laws 
State 
Consumer 
Protection 
Statute 
Description 
AL 
ALA. CODE 
§§ 8-19-1 to 
8-19-15 
The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act has a broad definition 
of deceptive trade practices, ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (LexisNexis 2002), 
and it grants enforcement authority to the Attorney General and 
District Attorneys. § 8-19-4(a)(1)-(a)(3).  The penalty for violating 
the Act is no more than $2,000. § 8-19-11(b).  There is a one year 
statute of limitations. § 8-19-14. 
AK 
ALASKA 
STAT. §§ 
45.50.471 to 
45.50.561 
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 45.50.471 to 45.50.479 (2012) list many 
unlawful acts related to consumer protection.  The Attorney General 
of Alaska has authority to enforce the consumer protection laws. § 
45.50.501(a).  Additionally, the Code provides for private and class 
actions. § 45.50.531(a).  The statute of limitations for private actions 
is two years. Id. at § 45.50.531(f).  A victorious plaintiff may be 
granted injunctive relief and attorney fees. §§ 45.50.535, 45.50.537.  
These consumer protection laws cannot be waived. § 45.50.542.  The 
Attorney General can recover between $1,000 and $25,000 for 
violations of the consumer protection laws. § 45.50.551(b). 
AZ 
ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 44-1521 to 
55-1534 
The Attorney General of Arizona has enforcement authority. ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1524(A) (2013).  The state may recover up to 
$10,000 for violations. § 44-1531(A). 
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AR 
ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 4-88-
101 to 4-88-
207 
The Attorney General of Arkansas, through the Consumer Counsel, 
has civil enforcement authority of deceptive trade practices laws. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-104 (2011).  The Consumer Counsel is an 
administrative agency tasked with representing and protecting ‘‘the 
state, its subdivisions, the legitimate business community, and the 
general public as consumers.’’ § 4-88-105(c).  The Counsel has 
investigatory and enforcement authority. § (d)(3).  Violations of the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Chapter are also Class A misdemeanors. § 
4-88-103.  Penalties paid to the state for violations are not to exceed 
$10,000 and expenses. § 4-88-113(a)(3).  Moreover, ‘‘[a]ny person 
who suffers actual damage or injury as a result of an offense or 
violation as defined in this chapter has a cause of action to recover 
actual damages, if appropriate, and reasonable attorney’s fees.’’ § 4-
88-113(f).  The statute of limitations is five years. § 4-88-115.  Finally, 
there are enhanced penalties when elder or disabled persons are the 
targets of deceptive trade practices. §§ 4-88-201 to 207. 
CA 
CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 
1750 to 1785; 
CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE 
§§ 17200--509 
In addition to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, the Civil Code 
provides that ‘‘[a]ny consumer’’ harmed by unfair trade practices may 
bring an action to recover damages and/or injunctive relief. CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1780(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).  Individuals may bring 
class actions too. § 1781(a).  The statute of limitations is three years. § 
1783. 
CO 
COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 6-1-
101 to 6-1-115 
The Attorney General and District Attorneys of Colorado have 
authority to enforce Colorado’s Consumer Protection Act. COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 6-1-103 (2013).  The Attorney General and district 
attorneys are granted broad investigatory authority, too. §§ 6-1-
107(1), 6-1-108(1).  The remedies for violations of the Colorado 
Consumer Protection Act include injunctive relief and penalties not 
to exceed $2,000 per violation. §§ 6-1-110(3), 6-1-112(a).  There are 
also penalties for up to $10,000 for violating an injunction and for 
deceptive trade violations to the elderly. § 6-1-112(b).  There is a 
three-year statute of limitations. § 6-1-115. 
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CT 
CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 21A-1 to 
21A-12D; 42-
110A to 42-
110q 
Connecticut established a Department of Consumer Protection that 
has authority to enforce consumer protection laws and regulations. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21A-1(a), 21A-7(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013).  The Commissioner has authority to order investigations into 
deceptive trade practices. § 42-110d(a).  Any person harmed by 
unfair trade practices may bring a private or class action seeking 
damages; there is a three year-statute of limitations. § 42-110g(a)-(b).  
Moreover, ‘‘[t]he various state’s attorneys and prosecuting attorneys 
shall lend to the commissioner or Attorney General such assistance 
as either may request in the commencement and prosecution of 
actions pursuant to this chapter.’’ § 42-110l. 
DE 
DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 
2501 to § 
2598 
The Attorney General of Delaware may enforce consumer fraud 
laws. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2517(a) (2005).  All money received 
from such enforcement shall be placed in the Consumer Protection 
Fund which shall be used to fund consumer fraud enforcement. tit. 6, 
§ 2527(a) (Supp. 2012).  Any individual harmed by deceptive trade 
practices may seek injunctive relief, and the Attorney General may 
bring an action whenever a deceptive trade practice is likely to harm 
any person. tit. 6, § 2533(a), § 2533 (d).  The Attorney General may 
also seek civil penalties for no more than $10,000 for violations. § 
2533(e).  Formerly, tit. 6, § 2598 provided for civil penalties of up to 
$25,000 for violations or injunctions enforcing consumer protection 
laws; however, 77 Laws 2010, ch. 282, § 4 repealed this statute in June 
2010. 
FL 
FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 
501.001 to 
501.2101 
The Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Chapter defines 
‘‘enforcing authority’’ as the state attorney and Department of Legal 
Affairs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.203(2) (West 2010).  The state 
attorney and Department of Legal Affairs may bring actions for 
injunctive relief and actual damages, and the statute of limitations is 
two years. § 501.207.  They may also seek penalties of up to $10,000 
for violations of Deceptive and Unfair Trade regulations. § 501.2075.  
The penalties are increased for violations against the elderly. § 
501.2077.  All funds received through enforcement of the deceptive 
trade laws shall be placed in funds that accrue to the state. § 501.2101. 
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GA 
GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 10-1-
370 to 10-1-
407 
Georgia adapted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. GA. 
CODE ANN. § 10-1-370 (2009 & Supp. 2013).  A person likely to be 
damaged by a deceptive trade practice may seek injunctive relief. § 
10-1-737.  The administrator (it is unclear which organization the 
administrator is the oversees; the statute just says that he/she will 
‘‘perform all functions formerly performed by the Consumer Services 
Unit’’), advised by the Consumer Advisory Board, may issue orders 
prohibiting unfair or deceptive business practices and seek injunctive 
relief from courts. §§ 10-1-395, 10-1-397.  The administrator may also 
be granted civil penalties up to $5000 per violation. § 10-1-397. There 
is a two-year statute of limitations. § 10-1-401. 
HI 
HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 487-2 to 
487-16 
Hawaii established an Office of Consumer Protection. HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 487-2 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). ‘‘The director of the 
office of consumer protection is designated the consumer counsel for 
the State and shall represent and protect the State, the respective 
counties, and the general public as consumers.’’ § 487-5.  Accordingly, 
it would be difficult to pass statutes granting local governments 
enforcement authority because Hawaii has already explicitly 
recognized the Director as localities’ representation for consumer 
protection purposes. 
ID 
IDAHO CODE 
ANN. §§ 48-
601 to 48-619 
The Idaho Consumer Protect Act defines and governs unfair 
methods of competition, solicitation, tax return preparation, unfair 
telephone services, unfair bulk email advertisements, mortgage loan 
modification fees, and unconscionable practices. IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 48-603A to 48-603F (2003 & Supp. 2013).  The Attorney General 
of Idaho may bring actions for declaratory judgment, injunctive 
relief, and damages.  The state may recover damages on behalf of 
consumers and up to $5000 in civil penalties. § 48-606.  The court may 
also ‘‘[m]ake such orders or judgments as may be necessary to 
compensate any consumers for actual damages.’’ § 48-607(2).  Any 
purchaser or lessee who suffers loss due to unfair practices may also 
bring actions for restitution, and the court may award punitive 
damages to such consumers. § 48-608(1).  Civil penalties may be up to 
$10,000 per violation. § 48-615. 
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IL 
815 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 505/2 
to 505/12 
The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act defines a 
number of unlawful practices. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 505/2 to 
505/2Jjj (West 2004 & Supp. 2013).  The Attorney General or a 
State’s Attorney may bring actions for injunctive relief, and the court 
may impose a civil penalty of up to $50,000 (the statute does not say 
that the civil penalty is per violation). § 505/7.  Any person suffering 
actual damages from a violation of the Act may bring an action for 
damages. § 505/10a.  There is a three-year statute of limitations. Id. 
IN 
IND. CODE 
ANN. § 24-5-
0.5-1 
The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (DCSA) defines thirty-
six different categories of ‘‘deceptive acts’’ that are unlawful. IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 24-5.-0.5-3 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012).  Any 
person suffering from a deceptive act may bring an action for actual 
damages; if deception as willful, damages may be up to the greater of 
triple the actual damages or $1000. § 24-5-0.5-4(a-b).  The court may 
award reasonable attorney fees. § 24-5-0.5-4(j).  Private parties can 
bring class actions. § 24-5-0.5-4(b).  The Attorney General may bring 
an action to enjoin a specific deceptive act, or, if there is a pattern of 
such acts, to issue an injunction ordering the supplier to return the 
unlawfully received money to consumers. § 24-5-0.5-4(c).  The statute 
of limitations is six months. § 24-5-0.5-5. 
IA 
IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 
714.16 to 
714.16A 
Section 714 of the Iowa Code chapter on theft, fraud, and related 
offenses gives a very broad definition of what constitutes consumer 
fraud, including the intent that others rely upon ‘‘the concealment, 
suppression, or omission of a material fact’’ related to the lease, sale, 
or advertisement. IOWA CODE § 714.16(2)(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 
2013).  ‘‘The burden is on the person making the representation to 
demonstrate that a reasonable basis for the claim existed.’’ Id.  
Enforcement power is with the attorney general. § 714.16(4)-(6).  A 
private party may bring civil actions and the attorney general can 
request civil remedies of up to $40,000 per violation. § 714.16(7).  
Section 714.16A allows the Attorney General to impose an additional 
civil penalty up to $5000 per violation. 
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KS 
KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 50-
623 to 50-643 
The Kansas Consumer Protection Act instructs that it should be 
construed liberally. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-623 (West 2008).  The list 
of ‘‘deceptive acts and practices’’ is extensive (fourteen categories), 
and includes representations made knowingly or with reason to know 
that it could be deceptive. § 50-626(b).  Unlawfulness is not 
contingent on whether the consumer has actually been misled by the 
deceptive act. Id.  Enforcement power is with the Attorney General. 
§ 50-629.  A consumer may bring a civil action and recover damages 
(though not for class actions). § 50-634(b).  In a class action, 
consumer may recover an injunction and appropriate ancillary relief, 
but not damages. § 50-634(c). 
KY 
KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 367.110 to 
367.360 
The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act provides for the creation of 
a Consumers’ Advisory Council and a Division of Consumer 
Protection of the Department of Law for ‘‘aiding in the development 
of preventative and remedial consumer protection programs and 
enforcing consumer protection statutes.’’ KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
367.120(1) (LexisNexis 2008).  The Consumers’ Advisory Council is 
made up of state citizens, chaired by the Attorney General, and 
tasked with publishing an annual report on the state of consumer 
affairs in the state. § 367.140.  The Department of Law coordinates 
the consumer protection activities of the state, county, and city 
government; advises agencies and officials; conducts investigations, 
research studies, and conferences; acts as a central clearinghouse of 
information; and conducts consumer education programs. § 367.150.  
The Attorney General has broad power to issue an injunction in the 
public interest under section 367.190, and to investigate the matter 
thoroughly under section 367.240.  Anyone who was harmed by 
practices made unlawful by this Act may bring a civil action and 
recover actual damages and punitive damages.  The statute of 
limitations is two years since violation. § 367.220. 
LA 
LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 51:1401 to 
51:1425 
The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 
voids any contract made in violation of its provisions. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 51:1403 (Supp. 2013).  The Attorney General has power to 
investigate, enforce, and educate the public.  Section 51:1404 makes 
rules interpreting this provision. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1404 
(2003).  Section 51:1405 allows for the issuance of injunctions.  
Requests for civil penalties can be increased if victim is elderly. § 
51:1407.  Individuals may bring private civil actions, not as 
representatives of a class. § 51:1409. 
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ME 
ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10, §§ 
1211-1216 
Maine adopted the Uniform Consumer Protection Act.  Other 
discrete consumer protection laws have separate enforcement 
statutes, but these provisions are scattered and barebones. See 
generally ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1211--1215 (2009 & Supp. 2012). 
MD 
MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. 
LAW §§ 13-
101 to -501 
The Maryland Consumer Protection Act gives weight to the FTC and 
federal courts’ interpretation of ‘‘unfair or deceptive trade practices’’ 
but says the term should be construed liberally. MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 13-105 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2012).  It establishes a 
Division of Consumer Protection in the Office of the Attorney 
General. § 13-201.  The Division can sue for an injunction under 
section 13-406, and individuals can bring action for damages and 
reasonable attorney’s fees under section 13-408 (2013).  Penalties are 
limited to $1000 per violation, and $5000 per subsequent violation. § 
13-410.  Criminal penalties of $1000 or up to one year in prison are 
possible. § 13-411. 
MA 
MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. 
ch. 93A, §§ 1-
11 
Massachusetts declares unlawful all ‘‘unfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade 
or commerce.’’ MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (LexisNexis 
2012 & Supp. 2013).  The law should be construed and amended with 
an eye to the FTCA. Id.  The Attorney General can bring actions on 
behalf of individuals for injunction and actual damages. Ch. 93A, § 4.  
Individuals can bring civil actions for money damages and attorney’s 
fees and injunction. Ch. 93A, § 9, § 11.  Individuals can bring class 
actions. Ch. 93A, § 11.  Civil penalties can go up to $5000 per 
violation (and up to $10,000 per violation for failure to heed 
injunction) and reasonable costs of litigation and attorney’s fees. Ch. 
93A, § 4. 
MI 
MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. 
§§ 445.901-
.922 
The Michigan Consumer Protection Act gives a long detailed list of 
what constitutes ‘‘unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, 
or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.’’ MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).  The Attorney 
General can bring suit for fine of up to $25,000. § 445.905.  The 
business has a chance to voluntarily desist and avoid suit. § 445.906.  
The Attorney General can bring a class action on behalf of 
individuals under section 445.910, and individuals can bring actions 
for injunction and damages on behalf of themselves under section 
445.911.  Prosecuting attorneys can also initiate actions. § 445.915.  
The statute of limitations is the later of six years after occurrence of 
the practice or one year after the last payment in a transaction 
involving the practice. §§ 445.910-.911. 
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MN 
MINN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 
325D.09-.29 
The Minnesota law is not broadly defined.  It bans misrepresentation 
of price, quality of merchandise, and misrepresentation of ‘‘the true 
nature of [a] business, either by use of the words manufacturer, 
wholesaler, broker, or any derivative thereof or synonym therefor, or 
otherwise.’’ MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.12--325D.13 (West 2011 & 
Supp. 2013).  Individuals can sue for injunction and damages. § 
325D.15.  The law does not provide for penalties or actions by the 
attorney general or other state attorneys. 
MS 
MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 75-
24-1 to -29 
Mississippi established an Office of Consumer Protection. See MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (West 1999), which enforces a ban on ‘‘unfair 
methods of competition affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive 
trade practices in or affecting commerce.’’ § 75-24-5 (listing thirteen 
examples).  The Attorney General has power to bring suit. § 75-24-9.  
District and county attorneys can bring suit. § 75-24-21.  Individuals 
can bring suit for personal damages after trying informal adjudication 
first. § 75-24-15.  Class actions are not permitted. § 75-24-15.  
Penalties are up to $10,000 per violation and up to double this if 
violation was willful; half of the money goes to the Office of 
Consumer Protection, and the other half goes to the General Fund. § 
75-24-19.  Local courts are reimbursed for their costs. § 75-24-21.  The 
statute provides for a fine of up to $1000 for a knowing and willful 
violation, and up to five years in prison for subsequent violations. § 
75-24-20. 
MO 
MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 
407.010-.309 
The Missouri law prohibits ‘‘the act, use or employment by any 
person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, 
misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, 
or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or 
advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce or the 
solicitation of any funds for any charitable purpose.’’ MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 407.020 (West 2011).  Individuals, local attorneys, and circuit 
attorneys, as well as the Attorney General, can enforce the Act. § 
407.020.  Individuals can bring private civil actions and class actions 
for personal losses, and can be awarded injunction, actual damages, 
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. § 407.025. Penalties are up to 
$1000 per violation. § 407.100.  Additionally, the statute imposes a 
fine of $5000 per violation for failure to comply with injunction. § 
407.110.  All penalties go to the Merchandising Practices Revolving 
Fund and all other costs recovered go into the State Treasury. § 
407.140. 
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MT 
MONT. 
CODE. ANN. 
§§ 30-14-101 
to -143 
The Montana Consumer Protection Act protects against all ‘‘unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce.’’ MONT. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-
103 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).  Montana hinges its definition to the 
FTCA; thus any new rules must be consistent with the FTCA. § 30-
14-104.  The Act is enforceable by the entire Department of Justice. 
§§ 30-14-111, 30-14-102 (defining ‘‘Department’’ and ‘‘County 
Attorneys’’).  The Act is enforceable pursuant to a request by the 
Department and individuals. §§ 30-14-121 to 30-14-133.  Moreover, 
County Attorneys in counties with over thirty million dollars of 
taxable value may designate an employee to act as a full-time 
investigator. § 30-14-122.  Courts can grant injunctions and award 
damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees. §§ 30-14-131 to 30-14-133.  
There are penalties of up to $10,000 for willful violations and failure 
to comply with injunctions or TROs, and a $5000 penalty with up to 
one year imprisonment for failure to comply with the Act generally 
(willful or not). § 30-14-142.  Civil fines, costs, and fees go to the 
Department or the county fund, depending on where action was 
commenced. § 30-14-143. 
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NE 
NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 59-
1601 to 59-
1623, 87-301 
to 87-306 
The Nebraska Consumer Protection Act makes unlawful certain 
‘‘[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’’ NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 59-1602 to 1606 (2012).  The Nebraska Attorney General may 
enforce this Act in the name of the state. § 59-1608.  Recoveries 
received from the enforcement of the Act shall be placed in the State 
Settlement Cash Fund or the State Settlement Trust Fund. §§ 59-
1608.04, 59-1608.05.  The State may seek actual damages, injunctive 
relief, and civil penalties of up to $25,000 for violations of sections 59-
1603 or 59-1604, and up to $2000 for violations of section 59-1602. §§ 
59-1609, 59-1610, or 59-1614.  In general, the statute of limitations is 
four years. § 59-1612.  Nebraska adopted the Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act. §§ 87-301 to 87-306.  The Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act does not preempt the state’s Consumer 
Protection Act, which makes unlawful certain deceptive trade 
practices, defined in section 87-302, including unconscionable acts. 
§ 87-303.01.  Anyone who violates the Act is guilty of a Class II 
misdemeanor and subject to a civil penalty of not more than $2000 
for each violation. § 87-303.11.  Any person ‘‘likely to be damaged by 
a deceptive trade practice of another’’ can bring an action for 
injunctive relief. § 87-303.  ‘‘Proof of monetary damage, loss of 
profits, or intent to deceive is not required.’’ Id.  The statute of 
limitations for civil actions is four years. § 87-303.10.  The Attorney 
General has, in addition to the power to bring a civil action, has the 
power to require documentation from anyone he or she believes is 
engaging in a deceptive practice or unconscionable act and issue a 
cease and desist order without a hearing. §§ 87-303.02 to 303.03. 
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NV 
NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 598.0903 
to 0999 
Deceptive trade practices are defined in great detail in NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 598.0915 to .0925 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011).  
Those practices listed are also supplemented by practices ‘‘actionable 
at common law or defined as such in other statutes’’ of the state. § 
598.0953.  Deceptive trade practices may be investigated by the 
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, the Director of the Department 
of Business and Industry or the Attorney General. § 598.096.  The 
Attorney General may additionally bring a criminal proceeding to 
enforce the Act, or may bring an action on behalf of the state to 
obtain injunctive relief or civil penalties. § 598.0963.  In addition, 
county district attorneys can, in certain circumstances, bring actions 
on behalf of the state to obtain injunctive relief or civil penalties. 
§ 598.0985.  A person who violates a court order or injunction issued 
pursuant to this Act is subject to a civil penalty of not more than 
$10,000 for each violation, and a person found to have willfully 
engaged in a deceptive trade practice is subject to a civil penalty of 
not more than $5000 for each violation. § 598.0999.  If the deceptive 
trade practice is found to be toward an elderly or disabled person, 
there is a civil penalty of not more than $12,500 for each violation. § 
598.0973.  Any funds recovered in a civil action, except criminal fines 
and restitution, are deposited in a State General Fund and are used 
only to offset the costs of enforcing the Act. § 598.0975.  The statute 
of limitations for bringing civil actions under this Act is six years. 
§ 11.190. 
NH 
N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 358-A:1 to 
A:13 
A number of practices are defined as unfair methods of competition 
or unfair or deceptive in the Act. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 
(2008 & Supp. 2012).  The Attorney General may bring an action for 
injunctive relief or for ‘‘an order of restitution of money or property 
to any person or class of persons injured.’’ § 358-A:4.  Upon a finding 
that a person has engaged in an unlawful practice, the court may 
award the state civil penalties up to $10,000. Id.  In addition, ‘‘[a]ny 
person injured by another’s use of any method, act or practice 
declared unlawful under this chapter may bring an action for 
damages and for such equitable relief, including an injunction.’’ § 358-
A:10.  A victorious plaintiff will recover the amount of actual 
damages or $1000, whichever is greater. Id.  ‘‘If the court finds that 
the use of the method of competition or the act or practice was a 
willful or knowing violation of this chapter, it shall award as much as 
3 times, but not less than 2 times, such amount.’’ Id.  A three year 
statute of limitations applies to violations of the Act. § 358-A:3(IV-a). 
MORRIS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:24 PM 
2013] CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 1939 
NJ 
N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 
2A:14-1; 56:8-
1 to 56:8-25 
A number of practices are defined as unlawful, ‘‘whether or not any 
person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.’’ N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2 to 56:8-2.10 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013).  The 
Attorney General may investigate potential violations and hold 
hearings. § 56:8-3 to 8-3.1.  He may assess a penalty against the 
person alleged to have committed the violation, and any amount 
collected goes to the State Treasury ‘‘for the general purposes of the 
State.’’ § 56:8-3.1.  Any person who violates the act is subject to a civil 
‘‘penalty of not more than $10,000 for the first offense and not more 
than $20,000 for the second and each subsequent offense.’’ § 56:8-13. 
In addition, persons harmed and able to show an ‘‘ascertainable loss’’ 
may initiate an action, and there is an additional automatic 
imposition of treble damages. § 56:8-19.  ‘‘[T]he director of any 
certified county or municipal office of consumer affairs’’ can also 
bring a suit. § 56:8-14.1.  The statute of limitations for bringing a 
cause of action under the Act is six years in New Jersey. § 2A:14-1. 
NM 
N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 37-1-
3 to 37-1-4; 
57-12-1 to 57-
12-26 
The Unfair Practices Act makes unlawful certain ‘‘unfair or 
deceptive’’ and ‘‘unconscionable trade practice[s].’’ N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 57-12-2 to 12-3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 First Reg. Sess.).  
The Attorney General may bring actions in the name of the state for 
injunctive relief. § 57-12-8.  In addition, a person ‘‘likely to be 
damaged by an unfair or deceptive trade practice or by an 
unconscionable trade practice of another’’ may bring suit for an 
injunction without needing to show ‘‘monetary damage, loss of profits 
or intent to deceive.’’ § 57-12-10.  Any person ‘‘who suffers any loss of 
money or property’’ as a result of an unlawful practice under this Act 
‘‘may bring an action to recover actual damages or the sum of one 
hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater,’’ and if the practice was 
willful, the court may award up to three times actual damages or 
$300, whichever is greater. Id.  If a person willfully used a method 
unlawful under the Act, the Attorney General may recover from him 
a civil penalty of up to $5000 per violation on behalf of the state. § 57-
12-11.  The statute of limitations for bringing claims is six years for 
written contracts and four years for unwritten contracts. §§ 37-1-3, 37-
1-4. 
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NY 
N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW 
§§ 349 to 350-
F-1 
New York law makes ‘‘[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of 
any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service’’ 
unlawful. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2012).  Both the 
Attorney General and injured persons may bring actions for 
injunctive relief, restitution, or damages. Id.  The Attorney  General 
can recover civil penalties of up to $5000 for each violation, which 
shall accrue to the state. § 350-d.  Individuals can recover actual 
damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, but if the court finds 
the defendant willfully or knowingly violated the Act, the court can 
increase the award of damages ‘‘to an amount not to exceed three 
times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars.’’ § 349.  If the 
unlawful conduct is against an elderly person, the defendant is 
additionally liable for up to $10,000 in civil penalties, which go 
towards a state treasury fund used solely for the investigation and 
prosecution of consumer frauds against elderly persons. § 349-c 
(McKinney 2012).  The statute of limitations in New York is six 
years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2003). 
NC 
N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 75-
1.1; 75-8 to 
75-16.2 
North Carolina law declares all ‘‘[u]nfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce’’ unlawful. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-1.1 
(2012).  The Attorney General has the power to initiate civil actions 
for injunctive relief and damages. § 75-14.  He also has the power to 
‘‘call to his assistance in the performance of any of’’ his duties the 
‘‘district attorneys in the State, who shall, upon being required to do 
so by the Attorney General, send bills of indictment and assist him in 
the performance of the duties of his office.’’ § 75-13.  Any individual 
found to have violated section 75-1.1 is liable for a civil penalty of up 
to $5000 for each violation, which goes to the Civil Penalty and 
Forfeiture Fund. § 75-15.2.  Additionally, any person injured by a 
violation of this Chapter has a right of action and can obtain treble 
damages. § 75-16.  The statute of limitations for these civil actions is 
four years. § 75-16.2. 
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ND 
N.D. CENT. 
CODE. §§ 28-
01-16 ; 51-10-
01 to 51-15-11 
The Attorney General has the power to bring suit on behalf of the 
state to prevent and restrain violations of the provisions of the 
Unlawful Sales or Advertising Practices chapter or other provisions 
of law. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 51-15-07 (2007).  He can collect a civil 
penalty for each violation of up to $5000. § 51-15-11.  In addition, 
individuals are entitled to sue for damages and where the court finds 
the defendant knowingly committed the conduct, the court may order 
treble damages. § 51-15-09.  Further, if the violation is of the Unfair 
Trade Practices Law (Chapter 51-10), the several State’s Attorneys 
can institute a suit in addition to the Attorney General and harmed 
individuals. § 51-10-06.  All moneys recovered by the Attorney 
General go to a treasury fund. § 54-12-18 (2008).  The statute of 
limitations in North Dakota for these actions is six years. § 28-01-16. 
OH 
OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. 
§§ 1345.01 to 
1345.13, 
4165.01 to 
4165.04 
Deceptive trade practices are listed in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4165.02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 38 of the 130th Ga. Gen. 
Assembly).  A person injured or likely to be injured by another who 
commits a deceptive trade practice may commence a civil action for 
injunctive relief and damages. § 4165.03.  Unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices ‘‘in connection with a consumer transaction’’ are further 
defined in section 1345.02, and ‘‘unconscionable’’ acts or practices are 
defined in section 1345.03.  The Attorney General may bring an 
action with respect to these unlawful practices for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. § 1345.07.  The Attorney General can bring a class 
action on behalf of consumers as well. Id.  Suppliers who engage in 
violative practices may be liable for up to $25,000 in civil penalties. 
Id.  The statute of limitations for civil actions brought by the 
Attorney General is two years. Id.  One-fourth of civil penalties go to 
the treasurer of the county in which the action is brought, and three-
fourths go to the consumer protection enforcement fund. Id.  
Consumers harmed by violative acts also have a cause of action, in 
which they can get injunctive relief, can rescind the transaction or can 
recover actual economic damages plus up to $5000 in noneconomic 
damages. § 1345.09.  In certain cases the consumer can recover three 
times the amount of actual economic damages or $200, whichever is 
greater plus up to $5000 in noneconomic damages. Id. 
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OK 
OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 15, §§ 751-
765, tit. 78, §§ 
51-55 
The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act defines unfair trade 
practices and deceptive trade practices at OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 752, 
753 (1996 & Supp. 2012).  ‘‘The Attorney General or a district 
attorney may bring an action’’ for declaratory or injunctive relief and 
actual damages and penalties. tit. 15, § 756.1.  Aggrieved consumers 
also have a private right of action for damages. tit. 15, § 761.1.  If the 
violative act is also found to be unconscionable, the violator is also 
liable to the aggrieved customer for the payment of a civil penalty, 
recoverable in an individual action only, of up to $2000 for each 
violation. Id.  Any person found to be in violation of the Act in a civil 
action must pay a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation, in 
addition to any other penalties. Id.  ‘‘Civil penalties or contempt 
penalties sued for and recovered by the Attorney General or a 
district attorney shall be used for the furtherance of their duties and 
activities under the Consumer Protection Act.’’ Id. 
The Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act lists additional 
unlawful practices at tit. 78, § 53.  ‘‘Any person damaged or likely to 
be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another’’ may bring a 
civil action for injunctive relief and damages, although proof of actual 
monetary damages, loss of profits, or intent are not required for an 
injunction. OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 54 (2002 & Supp. 2013).  The 
Attorney General or a district attorney of the state is authorized to 
bring an action against one who misrepresents the geographic 
location of the supplier or lists a fictitious business name in a 
directory assistance database seeking an injunction or recovery of 
money unlawfully received from aggrieved customers (to be held in 
escrow for distribution to the aggrieved customers). Id.  The statute 
of limitations in Oklahoma is five years for contracts in writing, three 
years for contracts not in writing, and two years for an action for 
relief on the ground of fraud. tit. 12, § 95. 
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OR 
OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 
§§ 646.605 to 
646.691 
Oregon law defines unlawful practices at OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 646.607, 646.608 (West 2003).  A ‘‘prosecuting attorney who has 
probable cause to believe that a person is engaging in, has engaged 
in, or is about to engage in an unlawful trade practice may bring suit 
in the name of the State of Oregon in the appropriate court to 
restrain such person from engaging in the alleged unlawful trade 
practice.’’ § 646.632.  Any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of 
money or property may also bring an individual action to recover 
actual damages or statutory damages of $200, whichever is greater. 
§ 646.638.  The court or jury may also award punitive damages. Id.  
Actions must be brought within one year from the discovery of the 
unlawful method, act or practice, but ‘‘whenever any complaint is 
filed by a prosecuting attorney to prevent, restrain or punish 
violations of ORS 646.608, running of the statute of limitations with 
respect to every private right of action . . . based in whole or in part 
on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended 
during the pendency thereof.’’ Id.  The court may set a civil penalty of 
up to $25,000 for each violation of an injunction issued under section 
646.632, each violation of an assurance of voluntary compliance 
under section 646.632, and any willfully used method, act or practice 
declared unlawful by sections 646.607 or 646.608. § 646.642. 
PA 
73 PA. CON. 
STAT. ANN. § 
201-1 to 201-
9.3 
The Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law grants 
discretion to courts to provide damages to any ‘‘person in interest.’’ 
73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-4.1 (West 2008).  The Attorney General 
or ‘‘the appropriate District Attorney’’ may recover civil penalties (of 
up to $5000 for each violation) and equitable relief. § 201-8.  The 
Attorney General may ‘‘order the dissolution, suspension or 
forfeiture of the franchise or right to do business of any person, firm 
or corporation which violates the terms of an injunction issued under 
section 4 of this act.’’ § 201-9.   The Act provides for private actions as 
well. § 201-9.2. 
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RI 
R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. 
§§ 6-13.1-1 to 
6-13.1-28 
Rhode Island law defines ‘‘[u]nfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices’’ at R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-
13.1-1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012), and declares that these practices ‘‘in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce’’ are unlawful in section 6-13.1-
2.  The Attorney General may bring an action on behalf of the state 
for injunctive relief. § 6-13.1-5.  ‘‘Any person who purchases or leases 
goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or 
property’’ as a result of an unlawful practice may also bring an action 
(or class action) to recover actual damages or $200, whichever is 
greater. § 6-13.1-5.2.  The court may award punitive damages. Id.  
‘‘Any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued under 
section 6-13.1-5 is liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per 
violation. § 6-13.1-8.  The statute of limitations generally for contracts 
in Rhode Island is twenty years. § 9-1-17. 
SC 
S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 39-5-
10 to 39-5-170 
South Carolina law declares that ‘‘[u]nfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade 
or commerce’’ are unlawful. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (1976).  The 
Attorney General has the power to bring suit to enforce the Act, and 
if a court finds that a person is willfully using an unlawful practice, he 
is liable for a civil penalty of up to $5000 per violation. § 39-5-110.  If 
a person violates the terms of an injunction, he shall pay to the State 
a civil penalty of up to $15,000 per violation. Id.  In addition:  
It shall be the duty of the solicitors of each judicial circuit 
and all county and city attorneys to lend to the Attorney 
General such assistance as the Attorney General may 
request in the commencement and prosecution of actions 
pursuant to this article, or any solicitor or county or city 
attorney with prior approval of the Attorney General may 
institute and prosecute actions hereunder in the same 
manner as provided for the Attorney General; provided, 
however, that if an action is prosecuted by a solicitor or 
county or city attorney alone, he shall make a full report 
thereon to the Attorney General, including the final 
disposition of the matter. 
§ 39-5-130.  Any aggrieved individual may also bring an action to 
recover actual damages, and if the court finds the violation to be 
willful the individual can recover treble damages. § 39-5-140.  The 
statute of limitations for actions is three years. § 39-5-150. 
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SD 
S.D. 
CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 37-
24-1 to 37-24-
48 
South Dakota defines certain deceptive acts or practices at S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).  
The Attorney General can bring an action on behalf of the state for 
injunctive relief. § 37-24-23.  In addition, ‘‘It shall be the duty of 
state’s attorneys to render to the attorney general such assistance as 
the attorney general may request in the commencement and 
prosecution by the attorney general of actions pursuant to this 
chapter.  The state’s attorney with prior approval of the attorney 
general may institute and prosecute actions hereunder in the same 
manner as provided for the attorney general and shall make a full 
report thereon to the attorney general, including the final disposition 
of the matter.’’ § 37-24-24.  The Attorney General can recover a civil 
penalty of up to $5000 for each violation of an injunction issued. § 37-
24-26.  If the unlawful practice was intentionally used, the Attorney 
General can recover a civil penalty of up to $2000 per violation. § 37-
24-27.  In addition, any aggrieved person can bring a civil action for 
the recovery of actual damages suffered. § 37-24-31.  The statute of 
limitations for actions under this chapter is four years. § 37-24-33. 
TN 
TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 47-
18-101 to 47-
18-130 
The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act lists many unlawful, unfair, 
or deceptive acts or practices at TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104 
(2010).  The division of consumer affairs in the department of 
commerce and insurance (the ‘‘division’’) has investigative powers, 
subject to the approval of the Attorney General. § 47-18-106.  The 
Attorney General, at the request of the division, may bring an action 
in the name of the state for injunctive relief. § 47-18-108.  The court 
may order payment to the state of a civil penalty of up to $1000 per 
violation. Id.  In addition, any knowing violation of the terms of an 
injunction or order is punishable by a civil penalty of up to $2000 per 
violation. Id.  Any aggrieved individual may also bring an action to 
recover actual damages, and if the court determines the unlawful 
practice was willful it may award treble damages. § 47-18-109.  
Individuals must bring actions within one year from their discovery of 
the unlawful act or practice and not more than five years after the 
date of the consumer transaction giving rise to the claim for relief. 
§ 47-18-110.  Anyone who knowingly uses a method or practice which 
targets elderly persons and is in violation of this Act is liable to the 
state for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each violation. § 47-18-
125. 
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TX 
TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 17.41 
to 17.63 
Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act lists 
unlawful deceptive trade practices at TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 17.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). The consumer protection division 
has authority to bring an enforcement action for injunctive relief. 
§ 17.47.  In addition, the consumer protection division may request a 
civil penalty paid to the state in an amount of up to $20,000 per 
violation and an additional penalty of up to $250,000 if the practice 
was calculated toward a consumer sixty-five years of age or older. Id.  
Any person who violates the terms of an injunction shall pay a civil 
penalty of not more than $10,000 per violation, not to exceed $50,000. 
Id.  District and county attorneys have a duty of assistance to the 
consumer protection division, and they can institute and prosecute 
actions seeking injunctive relief with prior written notice to the 
consumer protection division. § 17.48.  Individual consumers may 
also maintain actions in certain circumstances for economic damages 
and injunctive relief. § 17.50.  If the trier of fact finds that the 
defendant’s conduct was committed knowingly, the consumer may 
also recover damages for mental anguish, not to exceed three times 
the amount of economic damages. Id.  Consumers can also file class 
actions. § 17.501.  Under certain conditions, consumers may waive 
the provisions of this Act, but such a waiver cannot be a defense to an 
action brought by the Attorney General. § 17.42.  All actions must be 
brought within two years of the date on which the false, misleading, 
or deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the 
consumer should have discovered the occurrence. § 17.565. 
UT 
UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 13-
11-1 to 13-11-
23 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act lists certain knowing and 
intentional acts as deceptive acts or practices at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-11-4 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2013).  The code declares that 
such acts or practices by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violate the Act. § 13-11-5.  The Division of Consumer 
Protection has enforcement authority under the Act. § 13-11-7.  The 
Division of Consumer Protection can bring an action for declaratory 
or injunctive relief or actual damages on behalf of consumers who 
complained to it. § 13-11-17.  It can also bring a class action on behalf 
of consumers for actual damages. Id.  The court may impose a civil 
penalty of up to $5000 for each day an injunction is violated, and all 
civil penalties are paid to the General Fund. § 13-11-7.  Individual 
consumers may also bring actions to obtain declaratory or injunctive 
relief or actual damages (or $2000, whichever is greater). § 13-11-19. 
Consumers can also bring class actions. § 13-11-20.  The statute of 
limitations for actions is two years. §§ 13-11-17, 13-11-19. 
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VT 
VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 
2451-2466A 
Vermont law declares unlawful all ‘‘[u]nfair methods of competition 
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practice in commerce.’’ 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012). ‘‘No actual 
damage to any person need be alleged or proven for an action to lie 
under this chapter.’’ tit. 9, § 2457.  The Attorney General or a state’s 
attorney, if authorized to proceed by the Attorney General, may 
bring an action in the name of the state for injunctive relief, a civil 
penalty of up to $10,000 per violation, and an order of restitution on 
behalf of a consumer or a class of consumers similarly situated. tit. 9, 
§ 2458(b)(1).  However, ‘‘[a]ny state’s attorney receiving notice of 
any alleged violation of this chapter shall immediately forward 
written notice of the same with any other information he may have to 
the ‘office of the attorney general, attention consumer protection 
division.’’’ tit. 9, § 2462.  Any person who violates the terms of an 
injunction issued shall pay the state a civil penalty of up to $10,000 
per violation. tit. 9, § 2461(a).  Any aggrieved consumer may also 
initiate an action for injunctive relief or damages. Id.  The statute of 
limitations for civil actions in Vermont is six years. tit. 12, § 511. 
VA 
VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 59.1-
196 to 59.1-
207 
The Virginia Consumer Protection Act declares unlawful certain 
fraudulent acts or practices committed by a supplier in connection 
with a consumer transaction at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-200(A), 59.1-
200.1(A) (2006 & Supp. 2013).  The Attorney General, attorney for 
the Commonwealth, and the attorney for a county, city, or town have 
investigative powers. §§ 59.1-201(A), 59.1-201.1.  These parties may 
also initiate civil proceedings for injunctive relief without needing to 
prove damages. § 59.1-203(A).  In addition, if the court finds the 
defendant willfully engaged in an unlawful act, the court may impose 
a civil penalty of up to $2500 per violation. § 59.1-206(A).  Any 
aggrieved person may also initiate an action to recover actual 
damages or $500, whichever is greater and, if the violation was 
willful, the trier of fact may increase damages to an amount up to 
three times the actual damages or $1000, whichever is greater. § 59.1-
204(A).  The statute of limitations for individual actions is two years, 
but when any government agency files suit, the time during which 
such governmental suit and all appeals therefrom is pending shall not 
count as any part of the period within which an action shall be 
brought. § 59.1-204.1(A)-(B). 
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WA 
WASH. REV. 
CODE 
§§ 19.86.01-
19.86.920 
Washington’s Consumer Protection Act declares unlawful ‘‘[u]nfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
the conduct of any trade or commerce.’’ WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.86.020 (West 2013).  The Attorney General may bring an action 
in the name of the state, or as parens patriae on behalf of persons 
residing in the state, for injunctive relief. § 19.86.080(1).  Any injured 
person may also bring a civil action for actual damages, and the court 
may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to up to three 
times the actual damages sustained by not to exceed $25,000. 
§ 19.86.090.  Any person who violates the terms of any injunction 
issued shall by a civil penalty of up to $25,000. § 19.86.140.  Civil 
penalties also apply to violations of §§ 19.86.020, 19.86.030, and 
19.86.040 in the amounts of $2000, $100,000, and $100,000, 
respectively, and the penalties are higher for corporations. Id.  The 
statute of limitations for damages actions is four years, but the 
running of the statute of limitations shall be suspended during the 
pendency of any action brought by the Attorney General. § 
19.86.120. 
WV 
W. VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 46A-
6-101 to 46A-
6-110, 46A-7-
101 to 46A-7-
115 
West Virginia law defines certain unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of 
money or property as a result of the use of one of these practices may 
bring a civil action to recover actual damages or $200, whichever is 
greater, or an injunction, only after informing the seller or lessor in 
writing of the alleged violation and providing the seller or lessor 
twenty days to make a cure offer. § 46A-6-106.  In addition, the 
Attorney General, after notice and hearing, may order a creditor or 
other person to cease and desist from engaging in violations. § 46A-7-
106.  Respondents aggrieved by an order of the Attorney General 
may obtain judicial review. Id.  The Attorney General may also bring 
a civil action for injunctive relief. § 46A-7-108.  If the court finds that 
the defendant ‘‘has engaged in a course of repeated and willful 
violations of this chapter,’’ it may assess a civil penalty of up to $5000 
for each violation. § 46A-7-111.  The statute of limitations for actions 
is four years. Id.  
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WI 
WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 100.18 
Wisconsin law defines certain practices as unlawful and deceptive at 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18 (West 2010).  Any person suffering 
pecuniary loss because of a violation of this section may sue to 
recover such monetary loss. § 100.18(11)(b)(2).  The statute of 
limitations for such actions is three years after the occurrence of the 
unlawful act. § 100.18(3).  The Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection (the ‘‘Department’’) or the Department of 
Justice, after consulting with the Department, or any district attorney, 
upon informing the Department, may commence an action in the 
name of the state for injunctive relief. § 100.18(11)(a). 
WY 
WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 40-
12-101 to 40-
12-114 
The Wyoming Consumer Protection Act prohibits unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices in consumer transactions.  It is enforced 
by the Attorney General's Office (specifically, the Consumer 
Protection Unit), which can seek civil penalties, injunctions, and legal 
fees for violations. Civil Penalties are capped at $10,000 per violation 
of provisions of the act and $5000 per violation of injunctions. WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-113(a)--(c) (2013).  These fees may be waived if 
the violator has provided restitution or reimbursement to inured 
parties.  Jail time is also a possible punishment for certain violations.  
Depending on the violation, the statute of limitations for the actions 
brought under the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act range from 
one to two years after discovery of the unlawful practice. § 40-12-109.  
Private parties can also seek damages for injuries suffered as a result 
of violations of the Act. § 40-12-108(a).  The Attorney General 
appears to be the sole enforcing authority and there is no mention of 
the abilities of municipalities to enforce the act.  Additionally, there 
is a separate section specifying that remedies provided in the act are 
the exclusive remedies for actions brought under it. § 40-12-114.  
Overall, the illegal practices are fairly broadly defined.  There is a 
long list of examples of specific violations, but the act also includes 
the catchall phrase ‘‘engages in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’’ 
§ 40-12-105(a). 
 
